The Challenges of Immigration to Race Based Diversity Policies in the United States
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The United States prides itself on being a nation of immigrants. The successful integration of millions of immigrants in the 18th, 19th, and 20th centuries remains a great and celebrated national accomplishment. The current immigration flows which began in the 1960’s and continue at very high levels (1.2 million per year) pose some of the same challenges the country faced before, as well as new issues and dilemmas. Indeed much of the scholarly and public policy debates on the processes of integration of new immigrants are about whether immigrants today will assimilate to American society in the same successful way as earlier immigrants from Europe did, or whether different policies are called for now because of different populations (non-whites from the Caribbean, Latin America, Asia and Africa), because of different ideologies about integration (a stress on multiculturalism and acceptance of different cultures), or because of changes in technology and transport that make sustained transnationalism more possible (Foner and Frederickson, 2004; Foner, 2005). There is no doubt that immigrants are making the United States even more diverse each year. But policies in the United States directed at managing diversity generally do not target immigrants per se. Rather, these policies are targeted at America’s racial divisions—most principally at the 12% of America’s population who are African American descendants of slaves.

Immigration policy in the United States tends to focus almost exclusively on determining who to let in, and how to deal with illegal immigrants. Only refugees are eligible for government assistance and some programs to help them integrate. Most immigrants are not given any government assistance as immigrants (although legal immigrants can qualify for government assistance if they are poor). For the most part cultural, social, civic, economic and political integration of immigrants and their
descendants has been left to market forces, the immigrants themselves, and to voluntary 
organizations. Thus specific policies that help immigrants integrate are very rarely 
directed at immigrants qua immigrants, but rather involve policies directed at racial and 
ethnic minorities (which include a large number of immigrants and their children), 
policies directed at low skilled, uneducated workers including debates about who is 
eligible for welfare state provisions and policies that affect immigrants through the shape 
of important institutions that impact their lives, such as the educational, housing and 
health care systems.

Current debates about managing diversity related to immigration in the United 
States focus on the prevalence of English language use, the relationship of different 
categories of immigrants to the welfare state, and on policies to manage racial diversity 
and end racial inequality.

We review developments in each of these policy areas. We argue that the debates 
over language are largely irrelevant, a very clear case of political grandstanding over an 
issue that has little empirical reality. The United States has always been, and continues to 
be extremely effective at stamping out any language other than English within one or two 
generations. We also review recent punitive changes in the welfare system that deny the 
social service safety net to immigrants, legal and illegal alike. These policy changes are 
important because they have begun to create different categories among legal immigrants. 
Previously legal permanent residents were indistinguishable from citizens in most 
categories of U.S. law. These new distinctions created by welfare laws could have long 
term effects on how the nation thinks about and reacts toward immigrants.
We then discuss the challenges current immigration poses for race based diversity policies. Current immigration, which is comprised of mostly non-white immigrants complicates debates over managing racial diversity in our society. The cultural acceptance and full integration of immigrants and their descendants in the past stands in rather sharp contrast with the caste like separation of blacks from whites and their systematic oppression throughout American history, as well as the legal discrimination and exclusion faced by other non-whites—Mexicans, Puerto Ricans, Asians, Pacific Islanders, and American Indians. Specific polices developed to change the racial hierarchy in the United States, the Voting Rights Act, anti-discrimination laws and the policies of affirmative action, were not designed to address the integration or absorption of immigrants, but to address longstanding patterns of racial inequality. As Nathan Glazer put it in his ironically titled book *We Are All Multiculturalists Now*, “Multiculturalism is the price America is paying for its inability or unwillingness to incorporate into its society African Americans, in the same way and to the same degree it has incorporated so many other groups” (Glazer, 1997:147). Yet the liberalization of the immigration law in 1965 and the resulting demographic shift in the sources of immigrants has increasingly meant that policies designed for one purpose—changing the relative standing of native minorities, have increasingly come to be used as a policy for managing current diversity.

We argue that immigrants and their descendants, because of their racial definitions in the U.S. as non whites, are both being helped by and ironically undermining the most far reaching diversity policy in place in the U.S.—affirmative action. Because of their identities as Blacks, Hispanics and Asians, first and second
generation immigrants qualify for race based preferences in hiring and university admissions. This program however was designed and sold to the American public as a program to help African Americans to overcome the crippling effects of slavery and the state sanctioned repression that existed until the Civil Rights movement in the 1960’s.

Over time this program has been interpreted less as a policy to redress past harm and more as a policy to guarantee diversity by race in the country’s key institutions—corporate workplaces, universities and professions. This diversity has increasingly been filled by first and second generation immigrants. The growing demographic complexity of the non white population, the relative success of the first and second generation immigrants and their offspring and the growing blended identities that result from high intermarriage rates fueled by successful immigrant integration all mean difficulties for race based diversity policies which we lay out in this essay.

We conclude the essay with an argument that while diversity policies do help somewhat in the integration of immigrants that the most important policy issue directly affecting immigrant integration is the future shape of the American economy. We argue that the economic incorporation of immigrants and the lack of a specific policy of immigrant incorporation have worked well in maintaining an openness and acceptance of immigration among native born Americans, as well as facilitating the eventual cultural assimilation of immigrants and their children. However, rising income inequality, stagnation of wages for low educated workers, and the huge problem of undocumented workers and their children pose significant challenges for immigrant incorporation in the years to come. These challenges threaten the fabric of American cultural incorporation of
newcomers much more than issues of language or other cultural differences, despite the attention given to these issues in popular debates.

**Demographics**

New immigrants to the United States bring diversity on a number of levels—most notably they make the United States more diverse in terms of race and ethnicity, in terms of social class, as measured by educational attainment, in terms of linguistic background and in terms of religion. Most attention in the U.S. has focused on ethnic, racial and linguistic diversity, with generally less attention and debate focused on social class and religion. The 2000 U.S. census counted 281 million people, among whom 31.1 million or 11.1% were foreign born. Another 10% are the children of immigrants, so that currently at least one in five Americans are first or second generation. Only 14 percent of the foreign born in the United States are from Europe. The largest group (43%) are from Latin America (including Central America, South America and the Caribbean), while 25% are from Asia, and 8% are from other regions of the world, such as Africa and Oceania. Mexicans are the largest single group of the foreign born and now compose 27% of all foreign born. In addition to Mexico, the top ten countries of birth of the foreign born are China, India, Korea, the Philippines, Vietnam, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, and El Salvador. At the beginning of the current wave of immigration, which began with the liberalization of the immigration law in 1965 the United States was primarily a nation divided between blacks and whites. In 1970, 88% of the U.S. population was white, 11% was Black and less than 1% consisted of American Indians,
Asians and Hawaiians. Hispanics, who are counted differently in the census and can be of any race, were only 5% of the total 1970 U.S. population. By 2000, the effects of immigration were readily apparent in the demographics of the country—75% of the population was white, 12% black, 4% Asian and 13% Hispanic. American Indians increased in number over the thirty years (through new people claiming or discovering their Indian heritage) but still were less than 1% of the population.

In addition to changing the relative numbers of different races and ethnic groups in the United States, immigration has also changed the generational distribution within American race and ethnic categories. Table 1 shows the generational distribution of each of the major race/ethnic groups in the country. As Suro and Passel (2003:6) point out, in the mid 20th Century the Latino population in the U.S. was dominated by the 3+ generation—it was primarily a group distant from immigrants who could be considered a native minority. By 2000 the majority (68%) of Latinos are first or second generation. Indeed only Blacks and American Indians in 2000 are a majority non-migrant stock. Even blacks—the group whose experience most racial policies in the United States are designed to address—are now 10.2% first or second generation.

Immigration has not only affected racial diversity in the United States but has increased class and religious diversity as well. Immigrants are over-represented among those with low education. According to the census, among people aged 25 and over, 85% of native born Americans have a high school degree or higher while among immigrants only 67% do. The foreign born are especially over-represented among those with extremely low levels of education. Approximately seven percent of the foreign born have less than 5 years of schooling, 15% have between 5 and 8 years and another 10.8% have
between 9 and 11 years. In terms of employment, immigrants are concentrated among low wage workers. While immigrants are 1 in 9 U.S. residents, they are 1 in 5 low wage workers (defined as those who earned less than twice the minimum wage in 2001). Thus the fortunes of low wage workers in the American society disproportionately affect immigrants and their families.

Immigration also adds to the country’s religious diversity. Seventy-five to 80% of Americans are Christian and 5% report a non-Christina religion. Among new immigrants there is more religious diversity. Two-thirds of new immigrants are Christian, the majority being Catholic. Twenty percent report a non-Christian faith and one in six report no religious identity at all. In contrast to Western Europe the U.S. has received very little Muslim immigration. Muslims in the United States total about 3 million people, less than 1% of the total population (Warner, 2003).

**Language Diversity in the U.S.**

Language is one of the most controversial issues surrounding immigration. The ability of immigrants and their offspring to speak English is a potent political issue. In his attack on Mexican immigration to the United States, political scientist Samuel Huntington (2004) argues that current Latino immigrants and their children form “linguistic enclaves” and do not learn English. In a 1996 General Social Survey (GSS) question, 63% of Americans supported passage of “a law making English the official language of the United States, meaning government business would be conducted in English only.” In a 2000 GSS question, 75% of Americans agreed with the statement that “speaking English as the common national language is what unites all Americans.”
Twenty-seven states have responded to this perceived threat by passing official English laws—requiring that all government activity be conducted in English.

These “English only” laws vary by state. Some states just symbolically declare English the official language in the state. Others are more far reaching—mandating that all voting ballots be in in English, banning courtroom translations or restricting bilingual education. At the same time the federal government, under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, has mandated that federal agencies must make sure that all of their services are available to people who have limited proficiency in English. In practice this means that most federal services and programs do provide translation services for large language groups such as Spanish. The U.S. Census for example was printed in five commonly used languages in addition to English and enumerators and call centers were staffed by multilingual workers.

Despite the sometimes fevered pitch of public debates about language use by immigrants and their children, and the related debate about bilingual education, the evidence is that this is an unfounded fear. While the absolute number of people who speak a language other than English in their home is quite high—47 million people—the changes that are documented over time in language use all point to high levels of language assimilation. Bean and Stevens (2003), using data from the 2000 Census point out that among immigrants from non-English speaking countries, only 10% do not speak English at all at the time of the Census. They find a strong positive association between time in the U.S. for the foreign born and ability to speak English well.

The United States has always been very efficient at stamping out other languages and quickly assimilating the children of immigrants linguistically. And the consensus
among immigration researchers is that the standard three generation model of linguistic assimilation still holds in the United States. This model of language assimilation—the immigrant generation makes some progress but remains dominant in their native tongue, the second generation is bilingual and the third generation is monolingual English—appears to hold for most of today’s immigrants. Using 1990 Census data Alba et al (2002) find that even among Mexicans and Cubans, by the third generation two-thirds to three-quarters (respectively) of the groups do not speak any Spanish. Suro and Passel (2003) analyzed data from the 2002 National Survey of Latinos and showed that even for Spanish speakers, by the third generation no one is Spanish dominant (Table 2).

A sharp example of the disconnect between the knowledge of social scientists on this issue, and the concerns of the general public is the recent social science speculation that some linguistic assimilation can happen too quickly. Portes and Rumbaut (2001) argue that when children abandon a parent’s language too quickly the parents lose authority over the children. This dissonant acculturation leads to a situation where communication between parents and children is impeded—parents cannot understand English well, and children cannot understand the immigrant language well. They argue that children who maintain fluent bilingualism will do best academically. Other researchers have found a correlation between fluent bilingualism and academic achievement among 2nd generation school children (Bankston and Zhou, 1995; Warren, 1996). In a study of Asian and Latino youth using 1990 census data Cynthia Feliciano (2001) found that bilingual students are less likely to drop out than English only speakers, students in bilingual households are less likely to drop out than those in English dominant
or English limited households, and students in immigrant households are less likely to drop out than those in nonimmigrant households.

Why are Americans so worried about the preservation of English when careful data analysis shows such rapid language assimilation? The high levels of immigration mean that much language assimilation is invisible to the average American. While immigrants who have been in the U.S. for many years acquire English and while their children grow up fluent in English they are quickly replaced by newly arriving immigrants who only speak their native languages. The large number of Spanish speakers are particularly obvious because of their concentration in certain cities and regions and because of the growth of media—radio and TV—serving not only immigrants in the U.S. but also providing programming for channels in sending countries throughout Latin America. Language thus serves as a very visible and emotional issue for those Americans afraid of the high levels of immigration. This fear is understandable given the constant replenishment of foreign language speakers through continued immigration. But it is not justified or rational given the rapid language assimilation that is occurring over time and especially across generations.

**Different Categories of Immigrants and the Welfare State.**

As discussed by Christian Joppke, integration policies in the European Union are shifting towards civic integration, with the underlying agenda of making immigrants less reliant on the welfare state and more socioeconomically integrated in the host society (See Joppke chapter for review of integration policies in the European Union). This is done through both obligatory and voluntary language and civics courses. In contrast, the
United States—for better or worse—does not have policies aimed specifically at facilitating the integration process, whether it be in civics, language, or other areas of import. Immigrants in the U.S.—with the exception of refugees—are left on their own when it comes to integration. In the majority of cases the route to integration occurs though the labor market as immigrants obtain jobs and attempt to climb the social ladder. The self-integration process also entails the strategic use of existing race-based policies to gain entry into key American institutions. Access to social and welfare benefits is, perhaps, the only area where there are immigrant-specific public policies. These policies are less to regulate and distribute societal goods, however. Rather, they are intended to control and limit immigrants’ access to societal resources. By bracketing immigrants into citizen/non-citizen categories and within these categories, by legal-illegal residency status, the government is not really concerned with incorporating immigrants per se but rather with the policing of immigrants’ penetration of the welfare state.

In the United States, immigrants are grouped into five main categories: (1) legal permanent residents, (2) naturalized citizens, (3) undocumented immigrants, (4) refugees, asylees, and parolees, and (5) legal nonimmigrant residents. Legal immigrants, or immigrants admitted for permanent residence (LPRs) constitute about 9.3 million (or 30%) of America’s 30 million foreign born residents. Naturalized citizens make up another one-third (or 9.2 million) of the immigrant population while undocumented immigrants comprise about 28% of the foreign born stock (Fix and Passel, 2001). Cornelius (2005) estimates that of the one million immigrants who enter the United States annually, approximately 500,000 are undocumented immigrants.
The categorization of immigrants not only denotes residency status but also determines what kinds of social welfare benefits immigrants are entitled to. In 1996, immigrants’ eligibility for public benefits were drastically curtailed by the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORAt) and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRAIRA). PRWORA denies most types of federally funded means-tested assistance to noncitizens who arrived after the legislation was signed, and limited the eligibility of many noncitizens already living in the United States (Borjas, 2002: 2). Federal public benefits, which have not yet been identified by all of the relevant federal agencies, are defined generally by statute as “any grant, contract, loan, professional license or commercial license provided by” a U.S. agency and “any retirement, welfare, health, disability, public or assisted housing, postsecondary education, food assistance, unemployment benefit or any similar benefit” (Broder, 2005: 761). The determination of what constitutes a means-tested federal public benefit is left up to the individual agency to define, however. For example, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (2004) includes the services in Table 3 as being “public funded benefits.”

The 1996 welfare reform legislations created three categories that serve as the basis for determining eligibility for most benefit programs: (1) “qualified” immigrants, (2) “not qualified” immigrants, and (3) persons who are lawfully present in the United States (Broder, 2005: 759). Qualified immigrants who are eligible for federal benefits and services include:

- Legal Permanent Residents
- Asylees
- Refugees
• Immigrants paroled into the U.S. for at least one year\(^1\)
• Immigrants whose deportations are being withheld
• Immigrants granted conditional entry (prior to April 1, 1980)
• Battered immigrant spouses, battered immigrant children, the immigrant parents of battered children, and immigrant children of battered parents who fit certain criteria
• Cuban/Haitian entrants
• Victims of a severe form of trafficking (National Immigration Law Center, 2005a)

These qualified immigrants are, however, subjected to certain time-limited eligibility criteria. For example, even qualified immigrants have a 5-year waiting period before they can become eligible for Food Stamps and Supplemental Security Income (SSI).\(^2\)

All noncitizens who do not fit into one of the categories above are considered “not qualified.” Unqualified immigrants include all undocumented persons who either entered without documents or overstayed their visas, and who have no basis for obtaining lawful status. Unqualified immigrants also include some applicants for immigration benefits, such as applicants for cancellation of removal, adjustment of status, asylum, and registry, as well as persons who are otherwise lawfully present in the United States. Unqualified immigrants are barred from receiving federal public benefits (Broder, 2005: 761).

Despite the changes in legislation, most states have chosen to continue providing some form of state funded benefits to unqualified immigrants (Borjas, 2002).

Approximately 20 states use state funds to provide TANF, Medicaid, and/or SCHIP to some or all of the immigrants who are subject to the five year bar on federally funded

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\(^1\) The term paroled refers to the admittance of immigrants who enter the United States, often under claims of fear of persecution in their sending country. These immigrants, however, may not have official refugee or asylum status and would have to petition for such status while in the United States (North Carolina Justice Center, 2006; Wasem, 2005)

\(^2\) Certain qualified immigrants such as refugees, asylees, Amerasian immigrants, and Cuban/Haitian entrants are exempted from the five-year ban. Also, immigrants who entered the U.S. prior to August 22, 1996 and have either acquired qualified status prior to or after that date are exempted from the time limitations (Broder, 2005).
services (National Law Center, 2005). The 1996 legislative reforms did manage to achieve one of its objectives, that is, to cut short many immigrant households’ time on the welfare payrolls. Borjas (2002) noted that there was a precipitous decline in the welfare participation rate of immigrant households relative to that of U.S. born households nationwide. But most of the decline is attributable to the decreased welfare participation of immigrants in California. Elsewhere outside of California, the rate of welfare participation for immigrant and native households are similar.

Not surprisingly, undocumented immigrants have the least claim to social benefits. They are ineligible for Federal means-tested programs such as SCHIP, TANF and SSI. They may, however, receive the following benefits and services, which are deemed as necessary for health and survival:

- US-born children of undocumented immigrants are eligible for food stamps.
- Emergency Medicaid provided at public hospitals for undocumented immigrants who cannot pay or have no medical insurance; for those who can pay, can get discounted medical care.
- Free breakfast and lunch for children of undocumented immigrants attending public primary and secondary schools.
- Undocumented immigrants who have been abused or whose children have been abused by their U.S. citizen or lawfully permanent resident status partner may be eligible for public benefits and for “green card” status.

Social welfare benefits for undocumented immigrants can also vary from state to state. In New York, for example, immigrants are eligible for services such as public housing, Medicaid, prenatal care, or workers compensation, irrespective of their legal residency status (The Children’s Aid Society, September, 2003).

Despite the free access of undocumented immigrants to public primary and secondary schools, they are not guaranteed access to higher education at public
Section 505 of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 prohibits undocumented immigrants from receiving in-state tuition rates at public institutions of higher education. The law further places financial penalties for states that provide in-state tuition for undocumented immigrants by requiring the states to provide the same benefit to U.S. citizens in the same circumstances, regardless of their residence (National Immigration Law Center, July, 2005b). Fix and Capps (2005) estimate that 65,000 undocumented children graduate each year from American high schools. Yet, because of their illegal status, the majority of these children do not qualify for federal aid or scholarships (most scholarships, including federal aid, require U.S. citizenship or a green card) and thus do not have the financial means to pursue a college degree. Less than 10% of undocumented high school graduates go on to college (National Immigration Law Center, 2005b).

Human rights and immigrant advocates point out the irrationality of Section 505, which actually penalizes hard-working, academically oriented immigrant youth wishing to increase their human capital. Proponents of the law argue that the U.S. government should not reward clandestine immigration by providing reduced tuition rates for undocumented immigrants, even if these undocumented students spent practically their entire childhood and adolescence in the same schools as U.S. born and LPR children. The debate over in-state tuition for undocumented immigrants is highly publicized and politically charged because it speaks to the very heart of the U.S.’s ongoing love-hate relationship with immigration.

Despite the objection to “rewarding” clandestine immigration, some states have decided that the social benefits of providing affordable higher education to
undocumented immigrant youth far outweighs the costs. Currently, nine states—Texas, California, New York, Utah, Illinois, Washington, Oklahoma, New Mexico, and Kansas—allow undocumented immigrant students to pay in-state tuition fees (National Immigration Law Center, 2005b: 1). In order to qualify for in-state tuition, undocumented immigrant students must have attended primary and/or secondary school within the state. The specific school residency requirements vary from state to state. Legislation to allow in-state tuition rates for undocumented immigrants is pending in 14 other states as well.

An important pending legislation in the Senate that might change the fate of undocumented immigrant students wishing to pursue higher education is the Development, Relief and Education for Alien Minors (DREAM) Act. The DREAM Act would repeal Section 505 of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996. The legislation would also provide a mechanism for undocumented students to become legal permanent residents and to qualify for federal student aid. Hence, the DREAM Act may be a key pathway for undocumented immigrants to obtain legal residency status. It would also remove the current penalization against states that provide in-state tuition to undocumented immigrant residents. Although the DREAM Act would eliminate the federal penalty, it does not mandate that states provide in-state tuition to undocumented immigrants. Therefore, even if the DREAM Act passes, each state would ultimately have discretionary power over whether or not to allow undocumented immigrants to benefit from in-state tuition rates (National Immigration Law Center, 2005b: 3).
Note that the debate in the U.S. about social welfare and immigration is hardly ever framed as one about how immigrants can best be assimilated or integrated into the society. Instead the debate is about withholding benefits from immigrants based on their visa and citizenship status.

**Redesign of Citizenship Test**

While it is not ordinarily classified as a policy to manage diversity, regulations governing citizenship do actually manage the diversity resulting from immigration. Citizenship is one public policy strategy through which the United States government attempts to unify racially, ethnically, religiously, and linguistically diverse groups by encouraging a common American civic identity. Schuck (2003: 96) noted that U.S. naturalization laws “promote diversity by providing eligibility requirements that are easy to satisfy relative to the [more rigorous] naturalization statutes in Europe and Japan.” For example, the English and literacy tests are very easy to pass and have many exemptions. Nonetheless, there is still an underlying expectation that individuals living on American soil and particularly, those wishing to partake in the benefits of American citizenship, subsume some aspects of their ethnic identity for a an American identity which emphasizes a shared ideology that reflects a “commitment to a set of civic ideals that speak in universal terms and are accessible to all of humanity” (ibid: 98).

It has not been widely discussed in the media or in public policy circles, but the test immigrants take to gain citizenship is undergoing revision. When the proposed changes are made public it may become a topic of public debate.³ Each year,

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³ The National Research Council of the National Academies published an interim report on the redesign of the U.S. naturalization test in 2004. A final report will not be issued, however, due to a decision on the part of the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services of the Department of Homeland Security to not renew the contract.
approximately 600,000 people apply to become naturalized citizens of the United States. In 2004, about 662,794 petitions were filed for citizenship. Of these, a total of 537,151 (or 81%) were granted naturalization (Center for Immigration Studies, 2004). The racial and ethnic diversity of these newly naturalized citizens is reflected in Table 4. The majority of the naturalized citizens came from non-European regions such as Asia (41%), North America (28%)—of which 36%, 42%, and 16% are from the Caribbean, Mexico and Central America, respectively—and South America (7%). These figures lend support to Schuck’s (2003) argument that citizenship and naturalization laws both engender and serve as a means of managing diversity.

The recent government initiative to redesign the naturalization exam and standardize the administration of the exam may increase diversity even more by making the naturalization process less cumbersome for applicants. Currently, there are grave inconsistencies in the testing experience (from the content of the exam to the ways in which it is administered). The motivation for the redesign is to minimize disparate test-taking experiences. The United States Citizenship and Immigration Services is working with the National Academies of Sciences on this initiative. The role of the latter organization is to monitor the process and development of the redesign.

There are three proposed changes to the naturalization test. First, there is to be a reevaluation of the content covered in the civics test. The goal is to encourage naturalized persons to acquire a deeper understanding of American history and government (as opposed to just rote memorization of dates and facts). The second component involves changing the English exam (reading, writing and speaking) to reflect
comprehension of the English language. Furthermore, the redesign is supposed to take into account each individual applicant’s English proficiency level by administering appropriate examination questions. For example, staff will administer more complex sentences to highly educated applicants who are proficient in English, while presenting those with less education and limited-English abilities sentences that are more closely matched to their educational and language capacities (Center for Immigration Study, 2004).

These attempts at redesigning the naturalization exam may have important implications on the socioeconomic and demographic profile of naturalized citizens. For example, by synchronizing the English and literacy exam to an applicants’ English proficiency or educational attainment level, the redesign could feasibly increase the naturalization rates of limited-English applicants. Thus, one can imagine a situation where there is greater diversity in terms of education and English proficiency among the pool of naturalized Americans. Conversely, the naturalization redesign could also have a homogenizing effect by only selecting highly educated and English proficient applicants. It is only when the new design is made public that the full implications of the change can be assessed.

**Dual Citizenship/Transnationalism.**

In addition to this pending change to citizenship, the question of dual citizenship is another touch point for debates about whether new immigrants are somehow not assimilating in the same way that earlier immigrants did. Dual citizenship and naturalization challenge governmental attempts to unify the American people on the basis
of allegiance to one polity, i.e., the United States. Despite the existence of the 1790 naturalization statute, which requires naturalized residents to denounce all allegiance to previous nations, Americans can still obtain dual citizenship through other means. Dual citizenship can be acquired by the following:

- Birth in the U.S. to immigrant parents (thus, the U.S.-born child can claim citizenship of the parents’ country of birth),
- Birth abroad to a U.S. parent and a foreign parent (thus, the child can claim citizenship of both parents’ countries of birth),
- Marriage to a foreigner (thereby, transmitting his/her nationality to the spouse),
- Naturalization in another country after having acquired U.S. citizenship, and
- The ineffectiveness of the renunciation oath required of the naturalized citizen by the 1790 statute (and hence, the individual’s citizenship in the country of origin may still be legally valid) (Schuck, 2003: 97-98).

It is estimated that approximately 90% of legal immigrants in the United States originate from countries that allow dual citizenship. In some cases, such as Mexico where remittances account for a larger percentage of Mexico’s GNP, there are strong economic incentives to encourage dual citizenship, even among the U.S. born children of Mexican nationals.

How and whether or not dual citizenship and the transnational ties that it encourages will affect the management of racial and ethnic diversity in the United States is still an empirical question left to be answered. On the one hand, the diminished salience of transnational activities among second and later generation immigrants in the United States suggests that transnationalism may only pose challenges to diversity management among the foreign born population (Levitt and Waters, 2002). On the other hand, globalization and the increasing interdependency and interconnectivity of different nations around the world, coupled with increased trends in international marriages,
suggest that dual citizenship is going to be a much more pervasive phenomenon in the future. Therefore, polyglot nations that rely on fragile bases of national identity—such as the American civic identity—may find themselves in need of identity reconceptualization (Schuck, 2003)

Policies to Deal with Race

In 1903, W.E.B. Du Bois foreshadowed that “the problem of the Twentieth Century is the problem of the color line” (1953: vii). More than a hundred years later, Du Bois’ characterization of the main division in American society still holds true, with perhaps the qualification that the color line is now more complex and more far reaching than “color” alone. Yet, despite the changing meanings and divisions of race and racial boundaries, the historical practice of depicting and organizing American society along racial lines still persists. And inequality in the U. S. is still very much tied to racial identity. For instance, in 1969, 10% of whites were living in poverty, the rate for blacks was 3.6 times higher at 36.7% and Hispanics were 2.6 times higher than whites at 26.5%. By 1999 poverty had declined but the differences by race were persistent. In 1999 6.5% of non Hispanic whites were poor, 21.2% of blacks and 19.2% of Hispanics were poor. (Danzinger and Gottshalk, 2005:57-58).

The centrality of race in American society today is reflected in the ways in which diverse immigrant populations are accommodated in the United States. As immigrants assimilate to American society, they also incorporate the American racial lens. For example, ethnographic research on West Indians reveals that black immigrants are often

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4 Scholars of race and ethnicity such as Herbert Gans (1999) hypothesized that the emergent division in the 21st century may not be between that of blacks and whites but rather between that of blacks and non-blacks. Other scholars like Mia Tuan (1998) contend that certain racial groups such as Asians would remain “forever foreigners” and not be so easily absorbed into one side or the other of the color line.
surprised when they encounter American racialization. Their newly acquired status as “black” in the United States can be shocking because in their countries of origin, West Indian immigrants (and others in their community) may not necessarily have considered themselves as black (Waters, 1999). Indeed, Patterson (2005) shows that in many regions of the world where black and Hispanic immigrants emigrate from, categories of race are much more fluid.

The racialization process that many ethnic and racial minority immigrants undergo in the United States, coupled with the laws and policies that govern the distribution of societal goods along racial lines, serve as strong incentives for immigrants to seek membership in established racial groups and engage in racial identity politics. In the following sections, we discuss two race-based policies that have enabled immigrants to partake in the distribution of societal goods in the United States.

**Non-Discrimination.** The Civil Rights Act of 1964 was aimed at dismantling institutionalized discrimination against African Americans. The Civil Rights Act (and later, the 1965 Voting Rights Act) was the result of the hard-fought struggles of the civil rights movement. Its main purpose was to address the problem of racial discrimination against African Americans. According to Skrentny (2002:100):

> Despite the inclusion of sex, religion, and national origin, the early discussion of other ethnic minorities by Truman’s Civil Rights Committee, and the presumably broad meaning of the prohibition on racial discrimination…American citizens and political elites saw Title VII [which covers anti-discrimination in employment] and the entire Civil Rights Act of 1964 as being a law for African Americans.

It was only later, during the late 1970s and early 1980s, that anti-discrimination policies were expanded to cover other racial and ethnic minorities such as Hispanics, Asians, and Native Americans as well as women and people with disabilities (Skrentny, 2002). Since
the Civil Rights Act also includes national origin as a protected characteristic, immigrants can obtain anti-discrimination protection on the basis of other protected characteristics (e.g., gender, race, ethnicity, disability status, etc.) irrespective of their noncitizen status. Thus immigrants and citizens who have one or more of these protected characteristics have legal protection against discrimination in many spheres of public and private life, ranging from voting rights, injunction relief against discrimination in places of public accommodation, desegregation of public facilities, desegregation of public education, nondiscrimination in federally-assisted programs, and equal employment opportunity. In the case of immigrant accommodation, we focus on education and employment.

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 bars discrimination in employment based on race, color, religion, sex or national origin and prevents employer retaliation against employees who take action against discriminating businesses. The law applies to employers with at least 15 employees, employment agencies and unions. Title VII also created the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) which is responsible for enforcing anti-discrimination in employment by monitoring private employers and investigating individual allegations of employment discrimination. Title IV of the 1964 Civil Rights Act regulates the assignment of students to public schools (at all levels ranging from elementary to post-secondary institutions) and within such schools without regard to their race, color, religion, or national origin. Thus, racial and ethnic immigrants and their children are, theoretically, protected against relegation to racially segregated, inferior schools (U.S. Department of Justice, 2005).

Anti-discrimination policies enjoy considerable support from the American people. It gels well with the American ideology of equal opportunity and does not
contradict notions of meritocracy. But anti-discrimination laws only allow for the redress of individual injustices after injustices have already been incurred and not necessarily the prevention of them (Harper and Reskin, 2005). Furthermore, since discrimination against a person on the basis of any of the specified characteristics is illegal, both racial and ethnic minorities and whites can seek protection under anti-discrimination laws. In contrast, affirmative action, a more controversial race-based policy that has garnered much political protest on both sides of the political spectrum, is aimed at preventing exclusion to occur in the first place by ensuring that protected-minority groups are included in various spheres of economic, educational and political life.

**Affirmative Action.** Similar to the various anti-discrimination laws that came out of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, affirmative action policies owed its existence to the black civil rights movement and were initially intended to redress the injustices incurred against the descendants of African American slaves (Skrentny, 2002). As we shall illustrate later in the paper, this initial logic of the policies challenges immigrants’ claims to affirmative action benefits. The volume of immigrants who could potentially benefit from affirmative action policies is enormous. Graham (2001:64) noted that in the year 2000, “16 million [out] of the 24.6 million foreign-born residents were non-citizens, yet they remained eligible for minority preferences under many affirmative action programs.” Immigrants who are noncitizens or who have yet to naturalize can claim affirmative action benefits on the sole basis of positioning themselves into membership in one of the protected-minority groups.

In its simplest and least contested form, affirmative action policies are almost indistinguishable from anti-discrimination policies. This type of regulation is referred to
as “soft” affirmative action. It entails activities such as outreach to protected-minority communities, providing career advancement training, and fair assessments for promotions. On the other end of the spectrum is what scholars call “hard” affirmative action policies, which is usually implemented as preferential treatment or compensatory affirmative action. The most extreme and controversial form of affirmative action is quotas. But despite public perception that affirmative action always translates into quotas, they are actually rarely enacted (Graham, 2001).

Affirmative action in education, employment, and federal contractors/small businesses are covered by different regulations, executive orders, and statutes. They also differ in implementation. For example, not all employers are required to enact affirmative action policies. In the private sector, only large companies with substantial government contracts must practice affirmative action (Harper & Reskin, 2005: 365). The bulk of affirmative action regulations in education, particularly higher education, have been for the most part, voluntary. Assessment of exclusion is usually based on proportional representation, i.e., whether a minority group is represented in schools or companies in proportion to their numbers in the general population (Harper and Reskin, 2005).

Preferential treatment policies have not garnered much public support, even from the beginning. The General Social Survey provides a good gauge of the American public’s attitudes towards affirmative action. During the early stages of affirmative action—1970s and 1980s—public support for preferential treatment was much higher. As shown in Table 5, between 1972 and 1982, approximately a quarter of Americans agreed or strongly agreed that the government should give special treatment to African
Americans. By 1998, this figure had dropped to 17%. Note, however, that between 1972 and 1982, more than half of Americans believed that the government should not give any special treatment at all to blacks. The percentage of Americans who are opposed to the government providing special treatment to blacks has hovered around 50% over the past two decades. Furthermore, more than half of Americans have consistently strongly opposed racial preferences in hiring and promotion. Part of the diminished support for affirmative action has to do with the belief among Americans that conditions for black people have improved. In the 1970s and 1980s, less than half of Americans believed that conditions for blacks had gotten better. In comparison, 66% felt that conditions for blacks had improved in 1998. Moreover, and consistent with notions of meritocracy, Americans feel that blacks should try to pull themselves up by their own bootstraps (as Jews, Italians, and other ethnic groups in the past had done) (See Table 6). As illustrated by the figures in Table 7, Americans tend to attribute the relative lack of socioeconomic success of blacks to motivational deficiencies and less to institutional barriers such as discrimination; hence, their opposition to government intervention.

Despite the public’s limited support for affirmative action, these policies have enabled racial and ethnic minorities, many of whom are immigrants, to make remarkable strides in education, particularly post-secondary education. In a review of the impact of affirmative action in higher education, Harper and Reskin (2005) show that contrary to opponents’ claims that affirmative action harms minority students by placing them in competition with better prepared white students, and thereby increasing minority dropout rates, minorities who attend more selective schools actually have higher graduation rates than their counterparts at less selective schools. Furthermore, minority retention rates
were higher at schools that practiced hard affirmative action (as opposed to schools that implemented softer forms of affirmative action). More revealing, however, is the decline in minority student applications at public universities in states, such as California and Washington, where voter referenda ended affirmative action in public employment and education (pp.363-364). The empirical evidence indicates that affirmative action has been instrumental in ensuring racial and ethnic minority immigrants’ inclusion in American society.

Yet, the success of the above-mentioned race-based public policies have also undermined the monoracial and monoethnic classification schemes that form the basis if these laws. In the absence of immigrant-specific integration policies, the U.S. government has relied on affirmative action and anti-discrimination laws as well as other public policies intended to remedy racial discrimination against African Americans. But increasingly, the correlation between racial and ethnic categories and social disadvantage or exclusion has grown weaker (Schuck, 2003). The case of Asians aptly illustrates this weakened connection between race and social exclusion. Although Asians (and Pacific Islanders) have protected-minority group status and qualify for affirmative action benefits, not all Asian ethnic groups are socioeconomically disadvantaged enough to justify preferential treatment. For example, East Asian groups such as the Chinese, Koreans and Japanese have incomes and educational levels that are similar to whites. South Asians, namely Indians, have incomes that surpass those of whites (Waters and Eschbach, 1995).

High intermarriage rates between Hispanics and whites and Asians and whites have also led to a substantial multiracial population who refuses to self-identify as
monoracials or monoethnics. The census recognized these changes by allowing respondents to check more than one race in the 2000 census for the first time. Seven million people, or 2.4% of the population said they identified with two or more races. This number is bound to increase as interracial marriage has been increasing a great deal. In 1970 less than 1% of all couples in the United States were from different races. By 2000, 5% of couples in the U.S. were from different races. Intermarriage rates are generally shaped by group size with smaller groups having higher out-marriage rates than larger ones. For Asians and Hispanics the foreign born have lower intermarriage rates than the American born, for whites and blacks the foreign born are more likely to out-marry. Among American Indians, a very small group, 57% have out-married. Among Asians the out-marriage rate is 16%, among Blacks 7% and among Whites 3%. But among U.S. born Asian women 44% have a non-Asian spouse, among U.S. born Asian men, 32% have a non-Asian spouse. Among U.S. born Hispanic women 31% have a non-Hispanic husband, among U.S. born Hispanic men, 29% have a non-Hispanic wife.

These intermarriage patterns are growing and yet the current system for allocating social benefits ignores this diversity. In fact, for purposes of affirmative action programs, the government top-codes multi-race and multi-ethnic self identification on the census and forces them into monoracial and monoethnic categories (Perlmann and Waters, 2004). The Office of Management and Budget issued guidelines for allocating mixed minority and white race individuals to the minority race; thereby, inflating the statistics for both (1) proportional representation estimates and (2) projections of the number of minorities that could potentially be eligible for affirmative action benefits. The growth of the multiracial population, and the logical result of growing intermarriage means that the
boundaries between groups are becoming more permeable and harder to define. This has legal implications for all kinds of anti-discrimination laws. If people can be counted as both white and black and discrimination in voting, for instance, is measured by whether the voting population matches the underlying demographics, how does one determine the base number for the denominator? And how much legitimacy can a system based on so many different permutations of multiple race reporting have in determining access to special treatment in hiring and promotions? (Goldstein and Morning, 2002; Harrison, 2002; Prewitt, 2002). Intermarriage has reached rates that are unprecedented in American history, and few would argue that this is not a very good thing. Yet the resulting ambiguity about the boundaries and meanings of our standard racial groups means that this success story of American diversity is undermining the bedrock of the system of laws and policies we have in place for protecting and ensuring that diversity.

The United States is heralded as an example of enduring stability and unity amidst great population diversity along racial, ethnic, religious, language, and other boundaries. Scholars such as Schuck (2003) attribute the success of America’s diversity management to codified laws that regulate the distribution of scarce societal goods to diverse groups of people. Policies such as affirmative action are one avenue through which racial and ethnic minority immigrants can partake in the American Dream. But this pathway to inclusion in American society is contingent on continued public support for affirmative action. As the situation currently stands, public support is waning. The expansion of affirmative action to include seemingly arbitrary racial and ethnic minority groups who may not necessarily have a history of injustice inflicted against them raises questions
about affirmative action’s legitimacy. The opposition to conferring affirmative action benefits on other racial and ethnic groups—including immigrants—stem mainly from the public understanding that, at its inception, affirmative action was supposed to only remedy the issue of African American exclusion.

By allowing voluntary immigrants (i.e., non-citizen, racial and ethnic minorities) to take advantage of affirmative action benefits, the government may in effect be further undermining the intentions of affirmative action by ignoring the continued exclusion of African Americans now that black representation in employment and education is on the rise (albeit due to the high participation rates of foreign born blacks) (Graham, 2001). Indeed a front page article last summer in the New York Times was entitled “Top Colleges Take More Blacks, But Which Ones?” The article reported on the deep consternation among black alumni from Harvard University who discussed the fact that a majority—perhaps as much as two-thirds of the “black” students at Harvard—are first or second generation immigrants or the children of interracial couples. The question debated at the meeting and reported in the newspaper was whether “African-American students whose families have been in America for generations were being left behind.” This is not an issue for just one university—a study by Douglas Massey and colleagues (2003) found that 41% of “black” students at 28 selective colleges and universities nationwide were of immigrant stock or multiracial. Recent empirical studies of the young adult children of immigrants in the U.S. find that they are doing better in terms of educational attainment and labor market achievements than native born Americans of the same racial backgrounds (Mollenkopf et.al., 2004). Affirmative action may indeed be good for immigrants and their children but it may still leave behind the group it was designed to
lift up—African Americans. This is a challenge that America will have to confront in the years to come.

Future Challenges: Immigration, Education and the Changing U.S. Economy

In closing we would like to suggest that specific immigration policies including race based policies such as affirmative action, while important, may have only marginal effects on the actual long run successful outcomes of immigrants and their descendants. Current immigrants to the United States are overrepresented among the less educated and the working poor. Policies developed in the last decade have not been designed to ease their integration into American society but rather to further restrict their access to the welfare provisions that remain for poor Americans. As Joppke and Morawska (2003) point out, the traditional view of immigrant incorporation is that there is a covenant between the immigrant and American society, whose sustained openness is exchanged against requesting immigrants to be self sufficient (see also Aleinikoff, 2003). Historically the United States has been so successful in accommodating immigrants because of the relative openness of its labor market and the social mobility achieved by immigrants and their descendants.

In recent decades the relative openness of America’s higher education system has also played a role. The large network of community colleges, the availability of GED degrees to older students and the large number of “second chances” the educational system provides has been an important source of opportunity and economic and social integration for first and second generations. This has been a largely unrecognized feature
of American public policy but it stands in sharp contrast to the often rigid educational systems in Western European countries. Cultural acceptance and full integration of immigrants followed behind this sometimes brutal, but over the long run rather successful incorporation into the labor market for the descendants of immigrants.

But European immigrants in the 20th Century entered an economy that began a long run expansion after the depression. This rising tide lifted the immigrants and their children and made good on the implicit bargain offered to immigrants—an open economy with the possibility of real social mobility for a majority of the newcomers and their descendants. The cost of giving up past allegiances and becoming part of an American mainstream was worth it given the payoff. But since the 1970s income inequality has been growing, and the fortunes of those at the bottom of the educational distribution have been declining, not growing.

Immigrants are concentrated in the categories of workers who have seen their economic fortunes decline over time in the last few decades. Income inequality has grown rapidly among families between 1973 and 2001. As Danziger and Gottschalk (2005:50) conclude: “Inflation adjusted annual earnings of male high school dropouts were 23 percent lower in 2002 than in 1975, and earnings for male high school graduates were 13 percent lower”. Economists have been debating the causes of this rise in income inequality but most agree that immigration itself, especially illegal immigration played a part by increasing the supply (and thus lowering the price) of unskilled labor. In addition, most labor economists point to the rise in international trade and loss of manufacturing jobs to offshore sites, the decline in unionization, and the falling real value in the federally mandated minimum wage. The consensus is that there has been a sharp
rise in the returns to education in the labor market—leading to diminished prospects for those with extremely low educations, who are disproportionately immigrants (Lenz, 2003).

The premium put on education in the current hourglass economy with many low wage dead end jobs and few jobs in between those and the higher paid jobs requiring at least a college education mean that immigrants and their children are facing a difficult future. This may upset the link between economic mobility and cultural incorporation that has worked so well for Americans in the past. If the U.S. does not provide the kinds of opportunities for the children of immigrants that characterized past immigrant generations, then we may lose the incentive for cultural assimilation that causes individual immigrants to insert themselves into the American economy and culture. This is a challenge to the Americanization of immigrants and their children that is far greater than the usual issues framed in these types of discussions—issues such as dual citizenship, transnationalism, linguistic or religious diversity. It is also a challenge best met through economic policy changes and investments in education and social welfare for poor Americans regardless of their race or immigration status. Diversity management may just be a giant distraction from the bigger issue facing Americans—keeping opportunity for advancement available for the poor and the working class.
Works Cited:


North Carolina Justice Center. 2006. The Immigration Legal Assistance Project. 


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Generation</th>
<th>Black</th>
<th>Asian</th>
<th>Hispanic</th>
<th>NonHispanic White</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1&lt;sup&gt;st&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>6.3%</td>
<td>61.4%</td>
<td>39.1%</td>
<td>3.6%</td>
<td>10.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2&lt;sup&gt;nd&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>3.9%</td>
<td>26.6%</td>
<td>28.5%</td>
<td>7.3%</td>
<td>10.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3&lt;sup&gt;rd&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>89.9%</td>
<td>12.1%</td>
<td>32.4%</td>
<td>89.1%</td>
<td>79.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>35.5</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>32.8</td>
<td>193.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2

Language Use by Generation, National Survey of Latinos

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Generation</th>
<th>Spanish Dominant</th>
<th>Bilingual</th>
<th>English Dominant</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st Generation</td>
<td>72%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Generation</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd Generation</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>78%</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 3. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services—Public Funded Benefits</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Adoption Assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Administration on Developmental Disabilities (ADD) - State Developmental Disabilities Councils (direct services only)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• ADD - Special Projects (direct services only)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• ADD - University Affiliated Programs (clinical disability assessment services only)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Adult Programs/Payments to Territories</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Agency for Health Care Policy and Research Dissertation Grants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Child Care and Development Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Clinical Training Grant for Faculty Development in Alcohol &amp; Drug Abuse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Foster Care</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Health Profession Education and Training Assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Independent Living Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Job Opportunities for Low Income Individuals (JOLI)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Low Income Home Energy Assistance Program (LIHEAP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Medicare (except that an alien who is lawfully present and was authorized to be employed with respect to wages used to establish his or her Medicare Part A entitlement, is eligible for Medicare benefits. For a definition of &quot;lawfully present aliens&quot;, please see 8 CFR 103.12.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Medicaid (except assistance for an emergency medical condition)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Mental Health Clinical Training Grants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Native Hawaiian Loan Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Refugee Cash Assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Refugee Medical Assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Refugee Preventive Health Services Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Refugee Social Services Formula Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Refugee Social Services Discretionary Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Refugee Targeted Assistance Formula Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Refugee Targeted Assistance Discretionary Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Refugee Unaccompanied Minors Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Refugee Voluntary Agency Matching Grant Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Repatriation Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Residential Energy Assistance Challenge Option (REACH)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Social Services Block Grant (SSBG)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• State Child Health Insurance Program (CHIP), and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF).</td>
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Table 4. Persons Naturalized by Region in 2004

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region/Country</th>
<th>Number of Persons</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>89,014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>218,974</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>34,531</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oceania</td>
<td>3,551</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North America</td>
<td>151,047</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caribbean</td>
<td>54,811</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>7,682</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>63,840</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central America</td>
<td>24,677</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South America</td>
<td>38,676</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other/Unknown</td>
<td>1,358</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>537,151</strong></td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Preference in hiring and promotion</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly favors</td>
<td>9.80</td>
<td>10.05</td>
<td>8.31</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Strongly opposes</td>
<td>57.26</td>
<td>56.34</td>
<td>59.95</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither strongly favors or strongly opposes</td>
<td>32.95</td>
<td>33.61</td>
<td>31.73</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Government should give special treatment to blacks</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree or strongly agree that government should give special treatment</td>
<td>25.28</td>
<td>19.12</td>
<td>20.03</td>
<td>17.65</td>
<td>15.98</td>
<td>17.17</td>
<td>17.34</td>
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<td>Agree or strongly agree that government should not give special treatment</td>
<td>53.25</td>
<td>51.78</td>
<td>48.87</td>
<td>49.71</td>
<td>53.92</td>
<td>53.02</td>
<td>50.44</td>
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<tr>
<td>Agree with both</td>
<td>21.48</td>
<td>29.10</td>
<td>31.10</td>
<td>32.65</td>
<td>30.10</td>
<td>29.81</td>
<td>32.22</td>
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Source: General Social Survey.
### Table 6. Discrimination Against Blacks & Black Mobility Opportunities

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<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Almost always</td>
<td>14.29</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sometimes</td>
<td>48.05</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Almost never</td>
<td>37.66</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Improved</td>
<td>49.35</td>
<td>47.41</td>
<td>54.38</td>
<td>59.75</td>
<td>65.67</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Gotten worse</td>
<td>28.57</td>
<td>33.62</td>
<td>12.40</td>
<td>9.69</td>
<td>5.29</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Stayed about the same</td>
<td>22.08</td>
<td>18.97</td>
<td>33.22</td>
<td>30.56</td>
<td>29.04</td>
<td></td>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agree strongly</td>
<td>44.57</td>
<td>44.46</td>
<td>43.11</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Disagree strongly</td>
<td>5.99</td>
<td>5.67</td>
<td>6.21</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: General Social Survey
Table 7. Why Blacks Have Worse Jobs, Income & Housing than Whites

<table>
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<th></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mainly due to discrimination</td>
<td>44.98</td>
<td>42.35</td>
<td>43.36</td>
<td>42.85</td>
<td>39.71</td>
<td>37.54</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blacks have less in-born ability to learn</td>
<td>20.89</td>
<td>17.75</td>
<td>13.01</td>
<td>13.41</td>
<td>10.21</td>
<td>9.96</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blacks don't have chance for education that it takes to rise out of poverty</td>
<td>53.84</td>
<td>53.84</td>
<td>54.94</td>
<td>51.13</td>
<td>46.19</td>
<td>45.08</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blacks don't have the motivation or will power to pull themselves out of poverty</td>
<td>65.83</td>
<td>59.61</td>
<td>52.54</td>
<td>52.22</td>
<td>50.66</td>
<td>46.33</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: General Social Survey.

1 A major exception to this laissez faire policy has been local primary and secondary schools who have a wide variety of ways of dealing with immigrant children who do not speak English.